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Archive for the ‘Rural Development’ Category
Thursday, January 12th, 2012
Andrew Foster
As the title of this initiative suggests, the notions of rural governance and inclusive growth are often paired in discussions of fiscal and political reform in India and around the world. It is suggested that rural governance and decentralization more generally may be a critical element in ensuring that the benefits of national economic growth are shared broadly across the economy, both between rural and urban areas, and among different groups within rural areas. But while there appears to be some level of consensus about what increasing rural governance means in the context of India, it is less clear what is meant by inclusive growth. This distinction is important because different elements of inclusive growth may be differentially served by increased democratization of rural governance and by fiscal decentralization.
One element of inclusive growth is the notion that the expansion in public resources made possible by higher productivity ought to be widely shared across the population. Even if the primary source of growth is in particular pockets of the economy, concerns of both equity and efficiency would suggest it is not desirable for all public resources to be targeted towards those pockets. Individuals in less rapidly growing areas should also benefit at least in part in terms of better quality health and schooling, functional roads, and access to reliable street lightsy and clean drinking water. Moreover, within rural areas it is important that these benefits be available to all. While fair and equitable distribution of public resources within rural areas is not a necessary implication of rural democratization and fiscal decentralization, increasing evidence from this initiative as well an emerging body of research elsewhere suggests that it in fact can play that role. Rural governance introduces some level of accountability both in terms of stewardship of resources and in terms of ensuring that the interests of numerically large (but poor in terms of social standing or economic resources) groups are accommodated.
But there is another element of inclusive growth, that which is related to whether the benefits of overall productivity expansion result in higher private earnings for all groups within the economy. In short, to what extent will individuals in rural areas and, within rural areas, those not endowed with substantial land or other physical resources, benefit from expanding productivity through access to better paying and more secure employment? This is an active and growing area of research that is also of substantial interest to policy makers. While some would argue that ensuring that new agricultural technologies are in the hands of smaller farmers is sufficient, others place emphasis on the growth of the non-farm sector as a source of employment in rural areas. It has been argued, for example, that in a setting in which villages are relatively isolated, agricultural productivity enhancement increases both land rents and wages and thus results in benefits to both rich and poor. On the other hand as a village becomes more integrated this may no longer be the case. Because land does not move but workers and investment capital do move, the local wage may respond slowly if at all to local agricultural productivity increases and thus most benefits of such growth will accrue to land-owning households. Moreover increased mechanization may displace workers as well as decrease the cost advantage of small farms that rely primarily on family labor, thus lowering wages and the financial viability of small farms. From this perspective investment and support of employment that is not intensive in the use of land can be a key mechanism to reduce rural inequality. Investment in particular in non-farm activities that make use of local agricultural inputs may be particularly helpful as it ensures that expanding agricultural productivity (which will depress local non-labor input costs) translates into better rural jobs.
The role of fiscal decentralization and rural governance reform in expanding rural earnings growth is less clear. Certainly such things as providing better schools increase the potential for good-quality employment both within the village and as a result of migration to urban areas. Migration also may have favorable effects on those not moving by reducing labor supply and through remittances that expand local incomes and increase the demand for local services. Also an adequate and fair basis for policing and dispute resolution can help to ensure that property rights are secure and thus increase the scope for the efficient allocation of financial assets towards non-farm activities. But many things that might otherwise promote growth in employment in rural areas such as more competitive financial markets, reliable power for businesses, and better access to markets appear to be beyond the scope of the governance of single villages. If the rural areas are to be successful in this latter regard, it is through working together to ensure that the interests of the rural poor are met in terms of promoting the competitiveness of rural economic activity. But if so, rural governance must be thought of as an integral part of a larger political system rather than an isolated entity that serves to ensure that the spoils of wider economic growth are equitably distributed.
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Andrew Foster is the Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics and Professor of Community Health at Brown University.
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Tags: Decentralization, Fiscal Reforms, Inclusive Growth, Inclusive Growthin India, Rural Economy, Rural Governance
Posted in decentralisation, government, Inclusive Growth, Inclusive Growth in India, Rural Development, Rural Economic growth, Rural Governance | 10 Comments »
Tuesday, July 26th, 2011
Sohini Paul
The world has never yet seen a truly great and virtuous nation because in the degradation of woman the very fountains of life are poisoned at their source. ~Lucretia Mott
Gender discrimination is a devastating reality in developing countries. Women are oppressed at home, at shops, and at the workplace. India is no exception. Women are dependent on family and kinship to access social goods and economic opportunities. The Government of India has passed several laws to protect women’s constitutional rights including the Hindu Succession Act (1956) and the Dowry Prohibition Act (1961). In addition, the government has provided several welfare measures to empower women that include the Indira Mahila Yojana (1995), the DWACRA Plan (1997) and Balika Samriddhi Yojana (1997). Monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of these programs at the national level is not an easy task. In such a scenario, the process of decentralisation would be a good solution for women particularly when they are linked to democratisation. Local institutions should have a better understanding of the problems of women at the village level compared to institutions at the central level. Thus, decentralisation has the potential to address the interests of women.
The Indian government has introduced a quota for women within the local government system, ideally to break down the traditional and cultural inequities working as barriers against women. The conjecture is the following: elected women leaders may have immense potential to encourage the women of the village to raise their voices and demand their rights in a direct or indirect manner. They may approach village women actively as a friend/neighbour or village women may be inspired by the boldness of the woman leader. This would empower local women. Though it is difficult to quantify empowerment, prioritising women issues and voicing them through political participation are important indicators of empowerment.
In 1992, the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments were enacted, leading the way for democratic grassroots governance. Thirty-three per cent of the seats at the local government level are reserved for women. It is important to note that the process of allocating reserved constituencies is random. After the women quota system was introduced in village councils (panchayats), approximately one million women have joined the elected local government bodies. However, the effective participation of women in local governance is ambiguous. It is argued that elected women may be proxies for their husbands, families or male leaders of political parties. They may get hardly any opportunity to work due to their lack of political experience and traditional social barriers. On the contrary, empirical studies have found that political participation among women has improved through their active participation in ‘gram-Sabha’ meetings. A study by Deininger, Jin and Nagarajan has pointed to increased willingness to contribute to the provision of local public goods in reserved villages. The question now is whether “women issues” receive priority in the ‘reserved’ villages.
Political reservation may have a stronger impact on women-centric issues, especially on the use of birth control measures as well as the health of girl children. In a ‘discriminating’ society, the onus of contraceptive use often falls on the women of the family. For example, the proportion of male contraceptive use in developing countries is significantly lower than the proportion of female contraceptive use. Approximately 70% of the contraceptive couples depend on female methods in poor countries. The ratio of female to male sterilization was 3 to 1 in China and 4 to 1 in Latin America (UN Report 2004, World Population Prospects). The use of contraceptives or non-use of any measure takes a huge toll on women’s health. High levels of fertility cause many of the health problems women face. Repeated termination of unwanted pregnancies through abortions also has a negative impact on her health. Does the pattern of use of contraception change in the ‘reserved’ villages?
Data collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey suggests that the mode of contraceptive use changed towards male methods over time and varied across reserved vs. unreserved villages. The proportion of males using condoms is higher by 7 points in ‘reserved’ villages compared to ‘unreserved’ ones. In contrast, the proportion of women going for sterilisation is 53% in the ‘unreserved’ villages while it is 44% in the reserved villages. There is, therefore, a more equitable distribution of males and females in the adoption of contraceptive use when the village Panchayat leadership is ‘reserved’ for women.
Trends over time suggest that the use of contraceptives has increased after political reservation. However, there is a sharp decline in the use of women-centric methods of birth control. The pattern is not uniform across different ‘disadvantaged’ groups. For instance, women belonging to scheduled caste households increasingly share the burden of using contraceptives relative to women from other castes.
To summarise, there is enough empirical evidence to suggest that political reservation for women has a positive impact on diversification of fertility control choices. The process of change, however, may be slow as changes in any behaviuoral pattern are usually slow.
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Dr. Sohini Paul is a Fellow at NCAER, New Delhi.
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Tags: decentralisation, Gender discrimination, Political Reservation, The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, Women Empowerment in Rural India
Posted in Gender discrimination, government, panchayat, People, Political Reservation, Reservation, Rural Development, Rural Governance, Rural Health Service | 10 Comments »
Wednesday, February 9th, 2011
Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize
The vision: During the immediate post-independence period, India developed the theory of ARD decentralization that is still valid today. It includes four key elements that contribute to positive agricultural and rural development: (i) community participation, (ii) decentralization, (iii) autonomous institutions at local and community level, and (iv) the application of modern agricultural technology. Global evidence shows that the vision has tremendous value in revitalizing the rural sector.
Positive international experience: Decentralization and increased popular participation are desirable not as ends in themselves, but because it has been observed that decentralization results in a wide spectrum of benefits. Among the benefits are: (i) enhanced transparency, (ii) enhanced government responsiveness as a result of increased accountability, (iii) reduced absenteeism, (iv) improved services at no extra cost, and (v) an improved quality of government outputs because local preferences are considered.
In the Philippines and Uganda, citizens perceive more corruption at central levels rather than at the local levels where peoples’ participation is wider (Azfar et al, 2000). Panel data of 30 countries shows clearly that entrenched, centralized political and bureaucratic cultures are the most significant determinants of corruption (Ivanyna and Shah ,2010). In a number of countries decentralization and community participation has led to quality improvements, costs savings, and the more timely completion of infrastructure projects, in particular. There are many types of examples from all parts of the world that support this general observation (Binswanger et al. 2010, Sud, 2010, and Bardhan, 2002).
In India decentralization and participation are still lagging after sixty years: In 1992/93, India’s central government took a major step towards greater decentralization, with the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. Nearly two decades after their passage, progress has been very slow, with half-hearted and very partial actions by most state governments. The delegation of increased responsibilities at lower levels of government has often not been accompanied by the granting of any significant autonomy. The fiscal system devolves less than five percent of the overall fiscal resources to local governments; and almost no revenue generation and functionaries; the design of India’s central and centrally sponsored schemes centralizes power in the ministries at the national and state level, effectively clawing back the powers that were to be devolved.
While community participation is advocated in most programs, full transfer of functions and funds to communities occurs rarely, and most programs, in design or practice, also claw back powers to higher level administrators. Therefore local governments and communities cannot function as intended, and their lack of performance, and even lack of interest, is then cited as a reason to continue to manage things for them. As a result, agricultural and rural development remains deeply centralized, with sectoral silos that have led to serious difficulties in service delivery. The plethora of centrally-sponsored schemes in India has rendered local governments and their citizens into chasers of grants and favours, and created a generalized system of bribes to access them that is so well described in the movie “Well done, Abba.”
Reforming dysfunctional rural development institutions involved a return to the four principles above:
India has been a pioneer in articulating a strong vision for decentralization and people’s participation in agricultural and rural development. It is time for India to finally translate its own vision into reality. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission, the Finance Commission, and the Planning Commission provide a full set of recommendations on how to move from decentralization as an intention to decentralization in reality. A key reform agenda would include:
1. Centrally-sponsored schemes need to be consolidated into block grants, as long recommended. Block grants should be directed at local governments, not line agencies, with sharing rules among levels of local government and with communities.
2. Further decentralization would include the transformation of local governments to independent tiers of government; strengthening of administrative decentralization and of horizontal and downwards accountability; and increasing revenue-raising and co-financing at all levels; otherwise efforts are likely to neither promote efficiency nor good governance.
3. A clear plan of action is needed. It will have to include practical ways to implement the already available recommendations of the various commissions, as well as political tactics to overcome resistance from central and state politicians and agencies. Advocacy from the highest level and a training program are needed to change the attitudes of the IAS officers and other central and state cadres to decentralization. The plan needs to involve the Interstate Council, local governments, progressive chief ministers, and members of civic society.
There are few prior conditions for success of decentralization: Decentralization has occurred in the presence AND the absence of a variety of conditions. For example, decentralization has occurred both with and without: (i) a strong middle class; (ii) prior land redistribution; (iii) a high human development index; and (iv) a strong civil society. It has occurred in countries that are ethnically diverse oe homogeneous, strife-torn or quiescent; and in countries where social hierarchies and patriarchies are strong or weak. There are few areas of the world in which inequalities are so extreme that decentralization is a dangerous option that should not be considered (Manor, 2009).
Necessary elements for success include: (i) a state that has some minimal capacity; (ii) devolution of substantial powers onto elected bodies at lower levels along with substantial resources; (iii) accountability mechanisms that ensure the horizontal accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives, and the downward accountability of elected representatives to ordinary people (Manor, 2009). A widely shared consensus is that success depends on the details of implementation and rigorous follow through.
Conclusion :
India has been a pioneer in formulating a strong vision for decentralization and increased people’s participation in agricultural and rural development. The vision is over sixty years old and in many countries has proven to be of tremendous value to revitalizing lagging agricultural and rural development sectors. It is essential for India that now the vision be translated into reality.
References :
- Azfar, Omar, Satu Kahkonen and Patrick, Meagher. 2000. “Conditions for Effective Decentralized Governance: A Synthesis of Research Findings.” IRIS Center Working Paper, University of Maryland
- Bardhan, Pranabh, 2002, Decentralization of Governance and Development, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, Number 4: 185–205
- Binswanger-Mkhize, Hans P., Jacomina de Regt, and Stephen Spector, 2010, “Local and Community-Driven Development: Moving to Scale in Theory and Practice,” New Frontiers in Social Policy, Washington DC, World Bank
- Ivanyna, Maksym and Anwar Shah, 2010, Decentralization (Localization) and Corruption: New Cross-country Evidence, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 5299
- Manor, James, 2010, Perspectives on Decentralization, Keynote Address at the IFPRI-University of Kiel Workshop on Government Decentralization Research, Washington DC, February 3-4
- Sud, Inder. 2010 “Governance for a modern society: Combining smarter government, decentralization and accountability to people” in Kohli and Sood (eds). 2010. India 2039: An affluent society in one generation. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
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1 The highest shares of public resources controlled by local governments in the developing world are: China (51%), Poland (38%), South Africa (28%), Uganda (25%), Indonesia (23%), and Brazil (20 %). These numbers stand in marked contrast to most sub-Saharan African countries (an average of around 5%), and India (3-4%).
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Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize is Professor Extraordinaire at the Institute for Economic Research on Innovation, Tshwane University of Technology, South Africa and a Senior Fellow of Amsterdam Institute for Development.
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Tags: Rural Development, Rural India, Rural Policy of India Govt.
Posted in decentralisation, panchayat, People, Rural Development, Rural Governance | 25 Comments »
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